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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-2759  
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JUSTIN MICHAEL CREDICO,  
 
             Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:14-cr-0118-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 15, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 6, 2016) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In March 2014, a grand jury indicted Appellant, Justin Michael Credico, on two 
counts of threatening a federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), and two 
counts of threatening a family member of a federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
115(a)(1)(A).1  Credico has filed a pro se interlocutory appeal of the District Court’s July 
2, 2015 Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to 
dismiss the second through fourth counts of the indictment.  We dismiss Credico’s 
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.   
 
1.   BACKGROUND 
 In December 2014, Credico filed in the District Court a pro se motion to dismiss 
the second through fourth counts of the four-count indictment.  In support of his motion, 
he claimed that the government could not show that the elements of the crimes were met.  
Following the filing of the government’s response to the motion, the Honorable Cynthia 
M. Rufe denied Credico’s motion to dismiss by Order filed February 13, 2015.   
                                              
1 The statute provides, in relevant part: “Whoever -- (A) . . . threatens to assault, kidnap or 
murder a member of the immediate family of . . . a Federal law enforcement officer . . .; 
or (B) threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, . . . a Federal law enforcement officer . . . 
with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such . . . law enforcement officer while 
engaged in the performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such . . . 
law enforcement officer on account of the performance of official duties, shall be 
punished . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A) & (B).  Here, Count One of the Indictment 
charges Credico with threatening to assault and murder FBI Special Agent #1 in violation 
of § 115(a)(1)(B), Count Two charges him with threatening to assault the wife of FBI 
Special Agent #1 in violation of § 115(a)(1)(A), Count Three charges him with 
threatening to assault and murder FBI Special Agent #2 in violation of § 115(a)(1)(B), 
and Count Four charges him with threatening to assault the daughter of FBI Special 
Agent #2 in violation of § 115(a)(1)(A).       
3 
 
 Credico then filed a pro se motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion 
to dismiss.  In support of his motion for reconsideration, he raised for the first time the 
claim that a trial on Counts Two through Four would violate his right to protection from 
double jeopardy on the basis that those counts were impermissibly multiplicitous.   
 A hearing was held on July 2, 2015, and by Order filed that same day Judge Rufe 
denied the motion for reconsideration.  Judge Rufe concluded that Credico’s claim was 
not a basis for reconsideration in that he did not raise his multiplicity challenge in support 
of his motion to dismiss and all of the facts necessary to bring the claim were known to 
him when he filed the motion to dismiss.  Nevertheless, Judge Rufe found Credico’s 
multiplicitous claim without merit since each count of the indictment required proof of a 
fact that the others did not: that a different person was threatened.  The District Court also 
denied Credico’s oral motion to file an interlocutory appeal from that ruling.  Credico 
immediately appealed the denial of his multiplicity challenge to the indictment.2   
 The government responds that since Credico is appealing a pretrial order, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.  The government further argues 
that even if we had jurisdiction, an affirmance of the denial of the reconsideration motion 
would be warranted in that the District Court properly found that Credico was not entitled 
to reconsideration, and in any event, there was no violation of the rule against 
multiplicity. 
                                              
2 Shortly after filing his appeal, Credico submitted a petition for a writ of mandamus 
requesting that we direct the District Court to stay “any and all proceedings” until we 
resolve his double jeopardy claim in his separate appeal.  We denied that petition.  See In 
re Credico, No. 15-2659, 611 F. App’x 754 (3d Cir. Aug. 7, 2015) (per curiam).     
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2.  DISCUSSION3 
 Credico claims that Counts Two through Four should be dismissed as 
impermissibly multiplicitous and may lead to multiple sentences for a single violation, 
which is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  See United States v. Pollen, 978 
F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1992) (defining “multiplicitous indictment”).  Thus, Credico argues 
that the District Court erred in denying his reconsideration motion. 
 The threshold question presented here is whether we have jurisdiction over 
Credico’s appeal of the District Court’s pretrial order rejecting his claim that the counts 
of the indictment with which he is being charged are impermissibly multiplicitous, in 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Concluding that we 
lack jurisdiction over Credico’s appeal under the circumstances of this case, we dismiss 
the appeal. 
 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 grants the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review 
“all final decisions of the district courts,” both civil and criminal.  Abney v. United States, 
431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977) (quoting § 1291).  This “final judgment” rule ordinarily 
“prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of sentence” in a criminal 
case.  United States v. Wright, 776 F.3d 134, 140 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Flanagan v. 
United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (citations omitted)).  Moreover, “[a]dherence to 
this rule of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal prosecutions because ‘the 
delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal,’ which the rule is designed to 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Our review of the 
threshold question of whether we have jurisdiction is plenary.  United States v. Wright, 
776 F.3d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 1999)).            
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avoid, ‘are especially inimical to the effective and fair administration of the criminal 
law.’”  Abney, 431 U.S. at 657 (quoting DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 
(1962)).   
 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Supreme 
Court announced the collateral order exception to the “final judgment” rule.  The 
collateral order doctrine permits appellate review of a “small class” of cases that “finally 
determine[s] claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action 
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that 
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”  Id. at 546.   
 The Supreme Court in Cohen identified a three-pronged test which, when 
satisfied, “render[s] the District Court’s order a ‘final decision’ within [§ 1291’s] 
meaning.”  Abney, 431 U.S. at 658; see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; Wright, 776 F.3d at 143-
44 (explaining the “three-pronged Cohen test”).  Under the collateral order exception, a 
court of appeals may exercise immediate review over Orders that: (1) conclusively 
determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from 
the merits of the action; and (3) are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.  Wright, 776 F.3d at 140 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463, 468 (1978) (citations omitted)).     
 “Time and again, the Supreme Court has reiterated the limited nature of” the 
collateral order doctrine.  Wright, 776 F.3d at 140.  The Supreme Court has “repeatedly 
stressed that the ‘narrow’ exception should stay that way and never be allowed to 
swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until 
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final judgment has been entered.”  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 
863, 868 (1994) (citations omitted).  Thus, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 
“modest scope” of the doctrine and pointed out that “although the Court has been asked 
many times to expand the ‘small class’ of collaterally appealable orders, we have instead 
kept it narrow and selective in its membership.”  Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 
(2006).  “This admonition holds special significance in criminal cases, where we must 
apply the collateral-order exception ‘with the utmost strictness.’”  Wright, 776 F.3d at 
140 (citing Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265).  As we pointed out in Wright and United States v. 
Wecht, 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008), “[s]uch appeals are thus permitted ‘only in the most 
rare and exceptional circumstances.’”  Wright, 776 F.3d at 140 (citing Wecht, 537 F.3d at 
244-45).   
 In Abney, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he pretrial denial of a motion 
to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds is obviously not ‘final’ in the sense 
that it terminates the criminal proceedings in the district court.”  Abney, 431 U.S. at 657.  
However, after applying the three-pronged Cohen test, the Supreme Court in Abney 
stated: “We therefore hold that pretrial orders rejecting claims of former jeopardy, such 
as that presently before us, constitute ‘final decisions’ and thus satisfy the jurisdictional 
prerequisites of § 1291.”  Id. at 662 (emph. added).   
 In support of this holding in Abney, the Supreme Court explained that the double 
jeopardy claim made in that case challenging a retrial on the indictment “contest[ed] the 
very authority of the Government to hale [the petitioner] into court to face trial on the 
charge against him.”  Id. at 660 (emph. added).  The Supreme Court’s conclusion was 
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“based on the special considerations permeating claims of that nature which justify a 
departure from the normal rule of finality.”  Id. at 663.  Indeed, Abney clarified: “Quite 
obviously, such considerations do not extend beyond the claim of former jeopardy. . . 
Rather, such claims are appealable if, and only if, they too fall within Cohen’s collateral-
order exception to the final-judgment rule.”  Id. (emph. added).      
 Consistent with that principle, we explained in Wright that “seven of our sister 
courts of appeals have found that the touchstone for interlocutory jurisdiction is a 
collateral-estoppel claim that, if successful, would require dismissal of, at a minimum, 
an entire count.”  Wright, 776 F.3d at 141 (emph. added) (citing cases which each 
involved claims of former jeopardy).4  Thus, these cases entailed the issue of former 
jeopardy or prior and successive criminal or civil proceedings.  See, e.g., Witkowski v. 
Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198-99 (3d Cir. 1999) (collateral estoppel requires, among other 
things, prior adjudication of an issue on its merits).          
 “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person 
shall be ‘subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’”  Jones 
v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 380 (1989).  The Clause affords three protections to a criminal 
defendant: (1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal; (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
                                              
4 In Wright, we cited the cases from our sister circuits in support of the proposition that 
interlocutory jurisdiction was dependent on whether the claim, if successful, would 
require dismissal of the indictment as a whole, or, at a minimum, dismissal of any single 
count.  Wright, 776 F.3d at 141-42.  However, we also noted that these cases involved 
collateral-estoppel claims.  Id. at 141.  
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conviction; and (3) protection against “multiple punishments for the same offense” 
imposed in a single proceeding.  Id. at 380-81 (citations omitted).     
 The Supreme Court in Jones v. Thomas pointed out that the first two protections 
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, which are the most familiar, protect against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after either acquittal or conviction.  Id. at 381.  
However, Jones involved a claim that a defendant’s initial conviction and sentence for 
both felony murder and the underlying felony violated the third aspect of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  Id.  In addressing the constitutional question of “what remedy is 
required to cure the admitted violation,” the Supreme Court observed that the “answer 
turns on the interest that the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect.”  Id.  In particular, 
the Court pointed out: “Our cases establish that in the multiple punishments context, that 
interest is ‘limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by 
the legislature.’”  Id. (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989)).  The 
Supreme Court in Jones concluded that the state-court remedy following the convictions 
and sentences “fully vindicated [the defendant’s] double jeopardy rights.”  Id. at 381-82 
(emph. added).   
 In the appeal before us, Credico claims that he is being charged with a 
multiplicitous indictment.  “A multiplicitous indictment charges the same offense in two 
or more counts and may lead to multiple sentences for a single violation, a result 
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.”  United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 83 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Stanfa, 685 F.2d 85, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1982)).  “The 
interest protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause in this multiple punishment context is 
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confined to ‘ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the 
legislature.’”  Id. (citing Jones, 491 U.S. at 381) (emph. added).            
 In United States v. Decinces, 808 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2015), our sister circuit was 
presented with an appeal of a pretrial Order where the appellant raised a double jeopardy 
claim premised on the theory that certain counts in the indictment were multiplicitous.  
As in the appeal before us, the appellant in Decinces argued that the Court of Appeals 
had jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 793.  
The Ninth Circuit found that this “claim flounders on the third prong [of the Cohen test] – 
reviewability following judgment.”  Id. (citing United States v. Tillman, 756 F.3d 1144, 
1149 (9th Cir. 2014)).  The Court in Decinces explained that it was undisputed that the 
appellant was entitled to a direct appeal should he be convicted of violations of both 
counts which he claimed were mulitiplicitous.  Id. (citing Tillman, 756 F.3d at 1149 
(noting that the collateral order doctrine is inapplicable where a direct appeal is 
available)).  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the appellant could not establish 
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.  Id. 
   Similarly, here where Credico argues that the counts in the indictment are 
multiplicitous, the “interest protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause in this multiple 
punishment context is confined to ‘ensuring that the total punishment [does] not exceed 
that authorized by the legislature.’”  See Pollen, 978 F.2d at 83 (citing Jones, 491 U.S. at 
381).  Credico does not claim a violation of the first two protections afforded by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, and significantly, his appeal does not involve former jeopardy.   
See Jones, 491 U.S. at 380-81; see also Abney, 431 U.S. at 662 (holding that “pretrial 
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orders rejecting claims of former jeopardy . . . satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of § 
1291”).  Rather, his appeal alleges a violation of the third protection afforded by the 
Clause – multiple punishments for the same offense imposed in a single proceeding.  See 
Jones, 491 U.S. at 380-81.   
 Even assuming, without deciding, that Credico’s double jeopardy claim is 
colorable and that the first two prongs of the Cohen test are satisfied, his appeal does not 
satisfy the third prong of the Cohen test since his claim can be effectively reviewed on 
appeal from a final judgment.  See Decinces, 808 F.3d at 793; see, e.g., Jones, 491 U.S. at 
381-82 (where remedy following the convictions and sentences “fully vindicated [the 
defendant’s] double jeopardy rights”).  Moreover, he does not show a likelihood that if 
review of his multiplicity claim had to await final judgment, his right against double 
jeopardy would be lost irreparably.  We therefore lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory 
appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.  
 
3.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this appeal does not qualify as an exception to the final 
judgment rule.  Accordingly, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  In holding that this 
appeal is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we express no opinion as to the merits.   
